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State-Mandated Occupational
Licenses, Harmful or Helpful? A
Look at the Due Process and Equal
Protection Principles Surrounding
the Constitutionality of
Occupational Licensing
Regulations *
I. INTRODUCTION
Mary Jackson, a twenty-eight-year lactation consultant veteran, saw
her ability to pursue her passion and her livelihood slip away with the
passing of the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act (Act)1 in
2016.2 Under the Act, the International Board Certified Lactation
Consultant (IBCLC) certification is required by the state of Georgia in
order to be considered a licensed lactation consultant.3 Due to her lack
of an IBCLC certification, Jackson, a Certified Lactation Counselor
(CLC), cannot legally perform her job, where she provides crucial

*I would first like to thank my Casenote advisor, Professor Jim Fleissner, for his
constant support and assistance throughout the writing process. His knowledge and
expertise were invaluable in the construction of this Article. A big thank you also to my
parents, Mark and Sonia Ivey, for their steadfast love and support throughout all my law
school endeavors. A final thank you to Tate Crymes who has supported and encouraged
me every step of the way.
1 Georgia Lactation Consultant Act, O.C.G.A. § 43-22A-1 (2020).
2 J. Justin Wilson, Breastfeeding Battle: New Georgia Law Will Put Many Lactation
Consultants Out of Work, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (June 25, 2018), https://ij.org/pressrelease/ga-lactation-consultants-sue-to-save-their-jobs-and-end-unconstitutionallicensing-law/.
3 O.C.G.A. § 43-22A-2 (2020).
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lactation support to families and mothers at Grady Memorial Hospital.4
This Act is one of many the Georgia General Assembly passed over the
years in an attempt to expand regulations on occupational licensing in
Georgia.5 However, instead, this Act detrimentally dampened the right
of Georgians to pursue the career path of their choosing in lactation
care and services.6
The battle between the police powers of the State and the right of
citizens to freely choose their profession has been a conflict ranging over
many centuries with roots in the authorities and rights granted by both
the U.S. Constitution as well as the Georgia Constitution.7 This battle
has taken a modern approach as courts now seek to address whether
the police powers granted to the State outweigh the constitutional
rights of Georgians to pursue the occupation of their choice and to
receive equal treatment along with those who fall into the same class.8
The Georgia Supreme Court delved into this constitutional dilemma
once again in Jackson v. Raffensperger,9 when it addressed whether the
Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act violated the Due Process
Clause10 and Equal Protection Clause11 of the Georgia Constitution.12
Relying on precedent, the court reaffirmed Georgians, specifically CLCs
like Jackson, that their passion will not go to waste because they have
the unwavering right to pursue a career in the occupation of their
choosing free from unreasonable government interference.13 Likewise,
the court reaffirmed the right of CLCs to be treated similarly to those
with an IBCLC certification.14
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Lactation care providers (LCs) offer breastfeeding education,
support, and other guidance to families in both clinical settings and in
4 J. Justin Wilson, Breastfeeding Battle: New Georgia Law Will Put Many Lactation
Consultants Out of Work, INSTITUTE FOR JUSTICE (June 25, 2018), https://ij.org/pressrelease/ga-lactation-consultants-sue-to-save-their-jobs-and-end-unconstitutionallicensing-law/.
5 See generally Bramley v. State, 187 Ga. 826, 2 S.E.2d 647 (1939) (professional
photography); Jenkins v. Manry, 216 Ga. 538, 118. S.E.2d 91 (1961) (plumbing).
6 Jackson v. Raffensperger, 308 Ga. 736, 736 843 S.E.2d 576, 578 (2020).
7 See generally U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; GA. CONST. art. I, § I, para. I-II.
8 See Jackson, 308 Ga. at 737, 843 S.E.2d at 578 (2020).
9 Id. at 736, 843 S.E.2d at 576 (2020).
10 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1.
11 GA. CONST. art. I. § 1, para. 2.
12 Jackson, 308 Ga. at 736–37, 843 S.E.2d at 578.
13 Id. at 737, 843 S.E.2d at 578.
14 Id.
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their client’s homes. It is important to note that LCs are not medical
providers, nor can they diagnose or treat any medical conditions.
Certification to become a LC is similar to other practitioners in the
medical field, where hopeful applicants seek accreditation through
private accrediting entities. In Georgia, there are two prominent
certifications that LCs can seek, Certified Lactation Counselor (CLC),
and International Board Certified Lactation Consultant (IBCLC). While
IBCLCs require college-level courses, continuing education courses, and
clinical hours on top of the examination in order to gain certification,
CLCs only need to complete a forty-five-hour course and pass an
examination.15
Further, CLCs and IBCLCs differ in a multitude of other ways.
There are many diverse settings lactation consultants can work in.
CLCs work in client’s homes as well as medical settings across the
state, thus increasing their accessibility to rural Georgians. IBCLCs, on
the other hand, are located primarily in metro Atlanta and other urban
areas as they are typically nurses or other healthcare professionals
along with their position as an IBCLC. Furthermore, IBCLCs
frequently charge their clients more than CLCs, as they are usually
associated with hospitals or similar institutions. In the state of Georgia,
there are roughly 335 IBCLCs compared to the more than 800 CLCs.16
Despite the licensure requirement difference, there is no evidence that
CLCs or any other unlicensed lactation consultant have ever “harmed
public health, safety, or welfare . . . .”17 Further, CLCs and IBCLCs are
“equally competent to provide lactation care and services to mothers
and babies.”18
In June of 2018, a non-profit organization by the name of Reaching
Our Sisters Everywhere, Inc. (ROSE) along with Mary Jackson, who is
a licensed CLC and the Vice President of ROSE, filed a suit against the
Georgia Secretary of State.19 Jackson and ROSE challenged the
constitutionality of the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act (Act),
which was created to regulate the practice of lactation care and services
by requiring a license from the Secretary of State.20 Jackson and ROSE
alleged that the Act violated the Due Process Clause of the Georgia
Constitution, which protects ones right to freely pursue an occupation.21

Id.
Id. at 737–38, 843 S.E.2d at 579.
17 Id. at 738, 843 S.E.2d at 579.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 736, 843 S.E.2d at 578.
21 Id.
15
16
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Likewise, Jackson and ROSE also alleged the Act violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Georgia Constitution on the grounds that the
Act treats similarly situated individuals differently.22 The Secretary of
State filed a motion to dismiss, stating there was a failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 23 The Fulton Superior Court
granted the motion to dismiss, citing that the Georgia Constitution
“does not recognize a right to work in one’s chosen profession . . . .”24
The court also referenced a failure on the parts of Jackson and ROSE to
adequately allege that a sufficient similarity existed between those who
were able to obtain a license and those who were not.25 Ultimately, the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed the holding of the trial court, citing an
extensive legal precedent which evidences the protection of Georgians’
right to work in their chosen profession without unreasonable
government interference.26 Further, the Georgia Supreme Court again
recognized that those who work in the same profession are generally
similarly situated.27
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. An Overview of the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act
The Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act is not the General
Assembly’s first attempt at regulating the LC profession. In 2013, the
Georgia General Assembly considered adopting a bill which would
require LCs to obtain licensing. After reviewing the proposed bill, the
Georgia Occupational Regulation Review Council (Council)
unanimously concluded there was no substantive evidence the LC
license requirement would improve the health and safety of Georgia
residents, and agreed the exclusion of all lactation certifications except
for the IBCLC would lead to a decrease in access to breastfeeding
support.28 The Council also advised that CLCs and IBCLCs are “equally
qualified” to provide Georgians with lactation care services.29 The
proposed 2013 bill died in the committee.30 Following the failure of the
2013 proposed bill, the General Assembly successfully passed the
Id. at 736–37, 843 S.E.2d at 578.
Id. at 736, 843 S.E.2d at 578.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 737, 843 S.E.2d at 578.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 738, 843 S.E.2d at 579.
29 Id.
30 Id.
22
23
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Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act in 2016 without review by
the Council. 31
The Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act outlines what
constitutes lactation care and services, as well as the licensing
requirements set forth by the state.32 The Act mandates any person
seeking to provide lactation care or services for compensation to acquire
a state-issued license.33 However, not every LC is eligible to obtain the
license; only IBCLCs are eligible.34 The lack of eligibility to obtain a
license deprives hundreds of CLCs from their right to legally pursue a
career in the field of their choice, lactation care.35 Looking past the
general description of what LCs do, the Act contains multiple
exceptions to the licensing requirement, with most regarding healthcare
professionals and students being exempt from the licensure
requirement.36 Notably, the Act exempts those who volunteer as an LC
from the licensure requirement so long as they do not hold themselves
out as a licensed LC, do not charge a fee, and do not receive any form of
compensation for their services.37
B. The Georgia Constitution Protects the Right to Work in One’s
Chosen Profession
The Due Process Clause of the Georgia Constitution states, “No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due
process of law.”38 Recognizing the long line of history surrounding the
due process clause, this statute applies to the right to pursue a lawful
occupation of one’s own choosing, free from unreasonable interference

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 43-22A-3(5) (2020). Lactation care includes lactation assessment through
data collection; the creation of lactation care plans; the implementation of lactation care
plans through demonstrations and instruction to parents, as well as communication with
primary care providers; and the education, recommendation, and use of lactation
assistance devices. Id.
33 O.C.G.A. § 43-22A-11 (2020).
34 O.C.G.A. § 43-22A-7 (2020).
35 See Jackson, 308 Ga. at 738, 843 S.E.2d at 579.
36 O.C.G.A. § 43-22A-13(4–5) (2020). The Act exempts those in the medical field and
other similar fields from needing to obtain a license. Further, those who are students or
preparing themselves for a career in lactation services are exempt from needing a license
so long as a licensed lactation consultant supervises the student. Id.
37 O.C.G.A. § 43-22A-13(6). Administrative expenses such as mileage are reimbursable.
Id.
38 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 1.
31
32
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from the government.39 For instance, the Georgia Supreme Court in
Bramley v. State40 struck down a statute requiring photographers to
pay a licensing fee, sit for an examination, and to show good moral
character in order to practice photography for hire.41 The Georgia
Supreme Court continues to apply this standard through a legal
analysis consisting of the court weighing whether or not the statute at
issue is a legitimate regulation created to protect a public interest, or if
it was created to restrict competition or promote revenue.42
The right to pursue the profession or trade of one’s choice has a
longstanding history in Georgia jurisprudence. The recognition of this
right has continued for upwards of four centuries, dating all the way
back to Anglo-American common law.43 The Due Process Clause of state
and federal constitutions came into existence from the Manga Carta’s
Law of the Land Clause, which barred British government charter
restrictions that created monopolies due to their unjust nature.44 These
clauses were understood from the beginning to protect the freedom of
one to practice a trade of their choice without undue interference from
government.45
While there is a right to pursue the trade or profession of one’s
choice, in 1849, the Georgia Supreme Court recognized the right of the
government to regulate the practice of a trade so long as it was to
protect the public from harm or fraud.46 The court specifically stated
that a prohibition on the growing of rice in a township did not violate
economic freedoms because “every right is subject to the restriction,
that it shall be so exercised as not to injure others.”47 Following this
precedent, the Georgia Supreme Court in Bethune v. Hughes48 struck
down an ordinance which prohibited people from selling goods outside
of a city market unless the market was open.49 The court reasoned this
ordinance was a violation of basic human rights, and hurt those who

39 Hugh William Divine, Interpreting the Georgia Constitution Today, 10 MERCER L.
REVIEW 219, 220 (1959).
40 187 Ga. 826, 2 S.E.2d 647 (1939).
41 Id. at 840, 2 S.E.2d at 654.
42 Moultrie Milk Shed, Inc. v. Cairo, 206 Ga. 348, 352–53, 57 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1950).
43 TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE RIGHT TO EARN A LIVING 17 (2010).
44 Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 747, 83 S.E. 645, 648 (1914).
45 Id.
46 Green v. Savannah, 6 Ga. 1, 11 (1849).
47 Id. at 13.
48 28 Ga. 560 (1859).
49 Id. at 565.
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were trying to make a living, instead promoting a selfish mentality of
the few who were favored by and benefitted from the ordinance.50
Generally speaking, Georgia courts have largely held to the
reasoning above, observing that “[t]he right to make a living is among
the greatest of human rights, and when lawfully pursued can not be
denied.”51 The gospel of public policy is salus populi suprema lex, that
is, the safety of the people should be the supreme law, and that the good
of the public should come before anything else.52 The Georgia Court of
Appeals recognized this ideology in Felton v. City of Atlanta,53 holding
that the freedom to work in one’s chosen profession, restricted only by
that which is necessary to protect public peace, health, safety, and
morality, is so deeply recognized that limitations thereon are strictly
construed.54 The court reasoned in Felton that when the main goal of
public health and safety is no longer the focus, the restrictions put in
place on labor are no longer constitutional.55
While a person is entitled to the right to pursue a career in the
profession of their choice, free from unreasonable interference from the
government, the State of Georgia has the right to exercise its police
power to “protect public health and welfare” through the regulation of
health related trades and professions.56 This power is given to the State
to provide for the general welfare of its people, and allows the State to
prescribe any regulations deemed necessary to secure its people against
the consequences of ignorance and incapacity, along with deception or
fraud.57 The Georgia Supreme Court confirmed this notion in Hughes v.
State Board of Medical Examiners,58 holding the State can exercise its
inherent police power through restricting licensees as necessary to
promote the welfare and safety of society.59

Id. at 564.
Schlesinger v. Atlanta, 161 Ga. 148, 158, 129 S.E. 861, 866 (1925).
52 Green v. Coast L. R. Co., 97 Ga. 15, 34 (1895).
53 4 Ga. App. 183, 61 S.E. 27 (1908).
54 Id. at 185, 61 S.E. at 27.
55 Id.
56 Brown v. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Psychologists, 190 Ga. App. 311, 312, 378 S.E.2d
718, 720 (1989); see also Foster v. Ga. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 257 Ga. 409, 419, 359
S.E.2d 877, 884 (1987); Wise v. State Bd. for Examination &c. of Architects, 247 Ga. 206,
207, 274 S.E.2d 544, 546 (1981); Hughes v. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 162 Ga. 246, 258,
134 S.E. 42, 47 (1926).
57 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122, 9 S. Ct. 231, 233 (1889).
58 162 Ga. 246, 134 S.E. 42 (1926).
59 Id. at 256, 134 S.E. at 46.
50
51
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C. Georgia’s Realistic Approach to Due Process
The United States Supreme Court in Nebbia v. New York60
abandoned its previously used “affected with a public interest” test,
instead moving toward protecting economic liberties by adopting a
policy of extreme legislative deference.61 The Georgia Supreme Court,
on the other hand, adopted a more realistic approach, declaring, “no
matter what other states or the Supreme Court of the United States
‘may or may not have decided,’”62 they will not follow the trend of
disregarding the significance of economic liberty as a constitutional
right.63 This stance allows Georgia courts to examine all restrictions on
the exercise of business activities in order to ensure that regulations
serve a legitimate public purpose and do not oppress any person.64
Following this precedent, the Georgia Supreme Court established a test
of reasonability, looking at the impact of the regulation on the licensee
and the public.65 This test ensures a person’s constitutional right to
practice any profession or occupation.66
On the other hand, the Georgia Court of Appeals acknowledged in
Brown v. State Board of Examiners of Psychologists67 that “[t]he State
of Georgia, in the exercise of its police power to protect public health
and welfare, may regulate health and related trades and professions.”68
The court in Brown cited to both Pace v. Smith69 and Baranan v. State
Board of Nursing Home Administrators70 when it held those in a
healthcare profession do not have the constitutional right to practice
healthcare, and that states can regulate healthcare licensing.71
Referencing the reasonability test in Baranan, the court determined
that a rule requiring applicants graduate from an accredited school was
291 U.S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
See id. at 533, 54 S. Ct. at 514.
62 Strickland v. Ports Petroleum Co., 256 Ga. 669, 670, 353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1987)
(quoting Cox v. GE Co., 211 Ga. 286, 291 85 S.E.2d 514, 519 (1955)).
63 Strickland, 256 Ga. 669, 670, 353 S.E.2d 17, 18 (1987).
64 Porter v. Atlanta, 259 Ga. 526, 528, 384 S.E.2d 631, 633–34 (1989).
65 Baranan v. State Board of Nursing Home Administrators, 143 Ga. App. 605, 606–07,
239 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1977).
66 Id.
67 190 Ga. App. 311, 378 S.E.2d 718 (1989).
68 Id. at 312, 378 S.E.2d at 720; see also Foster v. Ga. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 257
Ga. 409, 418, 359 S.E.2d 877, 884 (1987); Wise v. State Bd. for Examination &c. of
Architects, 247 Ga. 206, 207, 274 S.E.2d 544, 546 (1981); Hughes v. State Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, 162 Ga. 246, 258, 134 S.E. 42, 47 (1926).
69 248 Ga. 728, 286 S.E.2d 18 (1982).
70 143 Ga. App. 605, 239 S.E.2d 533 (1977).
71 Brown, 190 Ga. App. at 312, 378 S.E.2d at 720.
60
61
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constitutional, reasoning the rule was authorized by a statute creating
and giving power to the advisory board, and because the rule itself was
reasonable.72
The right of the state to regulate professions does not, however, turn
the right to practice in one’s chosen profession into a privilege which
can be withheld.73 Instead, the state must show good reason to take
away the constitutional right.74 The purpose of this good reason safe
guard is to protect the public from fraud and harm, not to protect those
in the trade already from competition.75 As mentioned above, the
rationale for licensing in the medical profession is one which requires a
special level of skill and training, where a lack thereof could endanger
the public or a person.76 The Georgia Supreme Court has previously
held that “[u]nless an occupation affords some ‘greater or more peculiar
opportunity for fraud than do most of the other common occupations,’
the police power is not to be successfully invoked to support a
regulation . . . .”77 When the basis of the licensing regulation is not
reasonable or rational in terms of public safety, the parameters put in
place by the state are unconstitutional.78
D. Equal Protection of Those in the Same or Similar Classes
The Equal Protection Clause79 of the Georgia Constitution dates
back to 1861, with roots in the State’s first Bill of Rights.80 Under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia Constitution, “Protection to the
person and property is the paramount duty of government and shall be
impartial and complete. No person shall be denied the equal protection
of the laws.”81 The beginning phrase has remained unchanged since
1868.82 The creation of a claim under the Equal Protection Clause
requires a claimant to establish they are similarly situated to other
members of a class who are treated differently.83 While reasonable
Id.
Riley v. Wright, 151 Ga. 609, 613, 107 S.E. 857, 859 (1921).
74 Id.
75 Richardson v. Coker, 188 Ga. 170, 175, 3 S.E.2d 636, 640 (1939).
76 Dent, 129 U.S. at 122, 9 S. Ct. at 233.
77 Richardson, 188 Ga. 170, 174, 3 S.E.2d 636, 640 (1939) (citing Bramley, 187 Ga. 826,
2 S.E.2d 647 (1939)).
78 State v. Moore, 259 Ga. 139, 141, 376 S.E.2d 877, 879 (1989).
79 GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 2.
80 GA. CONST. art. I. § 1, para. 2 (differs from the original Bill of Rights only by the
addition of the second sentence).
81 Id.
82 GA. CONST. OF 1861, art. I. § 1, para. 3 (1861).
83 Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga. 844, 847, 607 S.E.2d 569, 573–77 (2005).
72
73
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classification is allowed, the classifications must be based on a real or
substantial distinction, “bearing a reasonable and just relation to the
things in respect to which such classification is imposed . . . .”84
In 1910, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down an ordinance in
the City of Atlanta which required plumbers or those of the like to
submit to a written examination before obtaining their license.85
Plumbing firms could bypass this licensing examination requirement.86
As long as one employee from a plumbing firm had a license, then all
other employees could also obtain licenses.87 The ordinance arbitrarily
distinguished between those who were employed with a plumbing firm,
and those who were not, thus making it discriminatory and therefore
void.88 This challenge to the Equal Protection Clause was one of the
first which pertained to licensing, and set the stage for similar rulings
invalidating occupational licensing laws on the grounds of equal
protection.
Following the above referenced precedent, the Georgia Supreme
Court has consistently held that those who perform the same work are
similarly situated for equal protection purposes.89 For instance, the
Georgia Supreme Court in Gregory v. Quarles90 failed to ascertain a
difference between plumbers who were performing repair work in the
City of Atlanta, and those who were performing original work.91 The
court thus struck down a law which exempted plumbers who worked on
sewer connections that had already been made from taking an
examination, while requiring those who worked on new sewer
connections to take an examination.92
Likewise, in Southeastern Electric Co. v. Atlanta93, the Georgia
Supreme Court again struck down a law which treated members of the
same class differently.94 The court held the ordinance unconstitutional
due to the absence of a substantial difference or risk of harm related to

S. R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U.S. 400, 417, 30 S. Ct. 287, 291 (1910).
Henry, 133 Ga. at 887, 67 S.E. at 393.
86 Id. at 885, 67 S.E. at 392–93.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 886–87, 67 S.E. at 392–93.
89 Jenkins, 216 Ga. 538, 118 S.E.2d 91.
90 172 Ga. 45, 157 S.E. 306 (1931).
91 Id. at 49, 157 S.E. at 308.
92 Id. at 46–47, 157 S.E. at 307.
93 179 Ga. 514, 176 S.E. 400 (1932).
94 Id. at 514, 286 S.E.2d at 402–03 (holding that a license requirement for electricians
who work on new structures, but not existing ones, is unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds).
84
85
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the type of work performed.95 Following this decision, in 1939, The
Georgia Supreme Court invalidated a law requiring photographers to
obtain photography licenses in order to participate in the trade for a
profit.96 The court held photography does not “afford any greater or
more particular opportunity for fraud than do most of the other common
occupations of life.”97
Continuing the trend of protecting those who are seeking licensure
by the state, in Jenkins v. Manry,98 The Georgia Supreme Court held
that plumbers and steam fitters who were not employed by public
utility corporations were in the same class as plumbers and steam
fitters who were employed by public utility corporations.99 The court
reasoned that a statute requiring the examination of those who are not
employees of public-entity corporations while exempting the employees
of public-entity corporations is discriminatory.100 Deeming the statute
void, the court debunked the argument which claimed there is a larger
risk of public harm from those who are not employed by public-entity
corporations than those who are.101
Turning to the standards for determining whether a statute or
ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia
Constitution, the Georgia Supreme Court established a test used to
determine whether government classifications were reasonable and
have a fair and substantial relationship to the objectives of the city or
government.102 Employing this test for the first time, the Georgia
Supreme Court in Indep. Gasoline Co. v. Bureau of Unemployment
Comp.103 noted “a classification must be reasonable and have fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation,”104 thus invalidating
an unemployment provision on the grounds that it was
unconstitutional.105 The Georgia Supreme Court again applied this
standard in Geele v. State,106 striking down another law on the grounds

Id.
Bramley, 187 Ga. at 832, 2 S.E.2d at 650.
97 Id. at 838, 2 S.E.2d at 653.
98 216 Ga. 538, 118 S.E.2d 91 (1961).
99 Id. at 545–46, 118 S.E.2d at 97.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 City of Atlanta v. Watson, 267 Ga. 185, 475 S.E.2d 896 (1996).
103 190 Ga. 613, 10 S.E.2d 58 (1940).
104 Id. at 616, 10 S.E.2d at 60.
105 Id.
106 202 Ga. 381, 43 S.E.2d 254 (1947).
95
96
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of equal protection.107 The court rationalized its decision based off the
lack of a relationship between the amount a hotel charged guests and
overall fire danger to the structure, thus making the classification
arbitrary.108
IV. COURT’S RATIONALE
In Jackson v. Raffensperger, the Georgia Supreme Court dissected
two issues, whether the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act (Act)
was constitutional under the Due Process Clause and under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Georgia Constitution.109 Relying heavily on
several of the aforementioned cases, the Georgia Supreme Court held
the Act violated both the LC’s afforded due process rights and their
equal protection rights.110 In reaching its decision, the court first looked
at the Due Process Clause, and whether it entitles a person to pursue
an occupation of their choice, free from government interference.111
Turning to relevant case law, the court cited a laundry list of cases
where it previously affirmed that a person does in fact have the
constitutional right to pursue an occupation of their choosing.112
Focusing on Bramley v. State and Jenkins v. Manry, the court
confirmed it previously held statutes which prevent a person from
seeking the occupation of their choice are unconstitutional, thus
demonstrating the trial court erred in concluding an individual has no
right to pursue the occupation of their choosing.113
Next, the court focused on dismantling the trial court’s basis for its
findings. Starting with Brown v. State Board of Examiners of
Psychologists, the court rejected the Georgia Court of Appeal’s previous
holding that those in the healthcare field do not have a constitutional
right to practice since such a right “is subordinate to the state’s right to
regulate such a profession.”114 Both Brown and the trial court decision
in this case cited to Pace v. Smith and Baranan v. State Board of
Nursing Home Administrators, where the courts ruled both regulations
107 Id. at 387–88, 43 S.E.2d at 258. The statute required hotels and inns to maintain
proper fire escapes unless they charged their guests less than two dollars per day for the
duration of their stay. However, there was no increase in risk between the guests charged
different rates, and both were similarly situated. Id.
108 Id.
109 Jackson, 308 Ga. at 736–37, 843 S.E.2d at 578.
110 Id. at 742, 843 S.E.2d at 581.
111 Id. at 740, 843 S.E.2d at 580.
112 Id.
113 Id. The occupations in the cases consisted of photography and plumbing. Id.
114 Jackson, 308 Ga. at 740, 843 S.E.2d at 580 (quoting Brown, 190 Ga. App. 311, 312,
378 S.E.2d. 718 (1989)).
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within the respective cases were constitutional.115 Beginning with Pace,
this court quickly distinguished the case from Brown since Pace
involved a challenge to a ruling regarding the Georgia Bar Examiners,
which has nothing to do with the practice of a healthcare profession.116
Turning next to Baranan, the Georgia Supreme Court acknowledged
the Georgia Court of Appeals previous holding that “the right to
practice any profession or occupation is a necessarily valuable right and
is entitled to constitutional protection,”117 before it began to analyze
whether the rules in question violated the constitutional rights of the
appellant.118 While the court in Baranan later held the rules in question
were constitutional, the court never agreed to the notion that a person
has no right to pursue the occupation of their choice in healthcare
under the Georgia Constitution.119 The Georgia Supreme Court
reasoned Baranan stands for the proposition that “an individual’s due
process right to practice healthcare is subject to reasonable regulation
by the State.”120 This reasoning made it evident that the Georgia Court
of Appeals in Brown erred in concluding to the contrary, and the trial
court in Jackson erred in concluding that the Georgia Constitution does
not protect one’s right to pursue an occupation of their choosing, free
from unreasonable government interference.121 Thus, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that Mary Jackson and ROSE possess a valid Due
Process claim.122
Looking next to the Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia
Constitution, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court also
erred in failing to find CLCs and IBCLCs similarly situated.123 The
Georgia Supreme Court first reaffirmed the notion that the Equal
Protection Clause requires the State to treat similarly situated
individuals in a similar way.124 Next, the court further specified the
clause applies to members who fall within the same class.125 The court
outlined a long history, specifically referencing Jenkins v. Manry,
Jackson, 308 Ga. at 740, 843 S.E.2d at 580.
Id.
117 Id. at 741, 843 S.E.2d at 580–81. (quoting Baranan, 143 Ga. App. 605, 606, 239
S.E.2d. 533, 535 (1977)).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Jackson, 308 Ga. at 741, 843 S.E.2d at 581.
121 Id. at 741, 843 S.E.2d at 581.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Jackson, 308 Ga. at 741–42, 843 S.E.2d at 580–81 (citing Bell v. Austin, 278 Ga.
844, 607 S.E.2d 569 (2005)).
125 Id.
115
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Gregory v. Quarles, and Southeastern Electric Co. v. Atlanta as
instances where it consistently acknowledged individuals who perform
the same type of work are similarly situated for equal protection
purposes.126
When applying the legal precedent outlined above, the Georgia
Supreme Court held IBCLCs and CLCs are similarly situated due to
their facilitation of the same lactation care and services, during which
both are equally competent to provide lactation care and services to
mothers and babies alike.127 While the certification requirements for
IBCLCs and CLCs are different, the court reasoned even though
different credentials are obtained, this reason alone is not enough to
establish the differences necessary for IBCLCs and CLCs to be in
different classes.128 Thus, the court laid groundwork toward removing
arbitrary licenses that recognize little to no differences between those
who qualify, and those who do not.
To conclude, the Georgia Supreme Court boiled its opinion down to
the analyzation of the Act through the lenses of the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Georgia Constitution. After
addressing the vast legal precedent regarding the right to fair and
equal treatment when choosing an occupation, and the ability to freely
choose one’s occupation without unreasonable government interference,
the court concluded the statute violated the rights of LCs, thus
remanding the case to the lower court for reconsideration.129 The
statute may have been deemed reasonable had there been tangible
differences between the two certifications besides just the credentials,
or had there been a risk of public harm or fraud without the regulation.
However, without a greater distinction, the Act fails to survive when
viewed through the lenses of the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause.130
V. IMPLICATIONS
First, the Georgia Supreme Court broke significant constitutional
ground in their application of the Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause to state-mandated occupational licenses. The court
established that it will strike down indefensible licensing statutes
which only seek to exclude members of a class.131 This firm stance by
Id. at 741–42, 843 S.E.2d at 581.
Id. at 742, 843 S.E.2d at 581.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 742, 843 S.E.2d at 581.
130 Id. at 741–42, 843 S.E.2d at 581.
131 Id.
126
127
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the court helps to progress the growing idea the State should not have
the power to license any occupation it deems necessary for reasons such
as increased revenue or to reduce competition in the field.132 The
Georgia Supreme Court’s attempt to rein in the police powers of the
Georgia General Assembly through requiring licensing regulations to
serve a legitimate public interest consequently allows for increased
occupational freedom amongst Georgians.133
Second, with the downfall of arbitrary occupational licensing comes
a newfound autonomy for those seeking to practice a specific
profession.134 The relaxation in state mandated licensing requirements
allows for an increase in lactation consultants within the state, with an
anticipated rise in healthcare professionals and other professionals on
the horizon as more regulations are deemed invalid.135 Similarly,
relaxed licensing requirements will increase the geographic mobility of
lactation consultants as well as allow for additional interstate work.136
This movement away from arbitrary healthcare profession licensing
requirements opens the door for an increase in telemedicine and an
increase in the presence of professionals across the state, specifically in
rural Georgia.137
Third, there is no data suggesting that the movement towards
relaxed professional licensing risks harm to the public.138 There is no
substantial foundation for restricting licensure, reimbursement, or
support of LCs to just IBCLCs.139 The restrictions do not contribute to
existing efforts to support breastfeeding, nor are they associated with
higher quality care.140 Instead, these regulations are the result of
lobbying efforts across multiple states, meant to promote IBCLC
certification as a requirement for licensing while discrediting other
avenues of certification.141 An increase in unlicensed professionals,

132

Bramley, 187 Ga. at 837, 2 S.E.2d at 652–53; Felton, 4 Ga. App. at 186, 61 S.E. at
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See Felton, 4 Ga. App. at 187, 61 S.E. at 28; Jackson, 308 Ga. at 738, 843 S.E.2d at

28.
579.
134 See Gabriel Scheffler, Unlocking Access to Health Care: A federalist Approach to
Reforming Occupational Licensing, 29 HEALTH MATRIX 293, 298.
135 Jackson, 308 Ga. at 737–38, 843 S.E.2d at 579.
136 Scheffler, supra at 297–98.
137 See id.; Jackson, 308 Ga. at 737–38, 843 S.E.2d at 579.
138
FED. TRADE COMM’N, EXAMINING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION 9 (2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2014/04/00150-89997.pdf.
139 Id. at 4.
140 Id.
141 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, EXAMINING HEALTH CARE COMPETITION, 6 (2014),
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while beneficial to Georgians in terms of access to care and the cost of
care, sets the stage for a detrimental blow to the self-regulated
economic and competitive interests of those already in the profession.142
These efforts are not limited to just healthcare professions, they can be
found within professions such as podiatry, music therapy, and
cosmetology to name a few.143
Lastly, within the healthcare community, licensing often represents
prestige.144 The potential slackening of licensing risks the breakdown of
the hierarchy licensing creates in the healthcare profession.145 Further,
without a uniform licensing requirement statewide, the standard of
care loses its uniformity.146 The decline in standardized care criteria
welcomes the risk of an increase in lower quality care, as well as the
allowance for those who practice to increase the risk to public safety in
their specified field.147 The balance of power between protecting the
public in terms of harm and honoring the right of people to work in
their chosen profession is a delicate one which often flips with differing
circumstances and professions.148 Jackson v. Raffensperger represents a
niche case in a line of other cases which break the mold of state-issued
licenses.149 Nonetheless, the relaxation of state-mandated licensing
advances the emerging belief that rights often outweigh police
powers.150
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